I INTRODUCTION
Analysis of the role of the state in shaping industrial relations and employment practices has traditionally focused on labour law. Certainly, a key role of government has been to set labour standards through legislation, or by establishing legal systems of industrial relations whereby conflicts between employers and unions are resolved and there is a mechanism for the determination of appropriate rights and standards for employers and employees. Recently, however, a number of developments -including criticisms of labour law's capacity to accommodate flexibility in employment practices at the level of the firm (often referred to as a need for labour market 'deregulation'), questions about the effectiveness of legally prescriptive and hierarchical models of regulation, and a growth in corporate power -have converged to shift attention to other ways in which the state may influence labour standards and practices. 1 Increasing attention (particularly in Europe and the United States) has been paid to the use by states of 'soft' or 'light touch' approaches to regulating labour standards. Such regulatory approaches are yet to receive extensive consideration as forms of state labour regulation in Australian labour law scholarship.
In Australia, the Commonwealth government's Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) ('Work Choices'), which amended the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ('WRA'), brings into further relief the actual and potential use of light touch labour regulation by Australian states. Work Choices will reduce the impact of awards -historically the most influential and comprehensive form of legal regulation of employment conditions in Australia. Moreover, under Work Choices, the Commonwealth government has created a national system of labour law by 'covering the field' of industrial law, severely restricting the jurisdiction of state governments to use law to regulate corporate labour practices within their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the federal takeover has the potential to bring a 'cauldron of innovation' 2 to the boil by causing state governments (and perhaps local governments) in Australia to consider creative approaches to labour regulation, including light touch approaches. While it is too early to evaluate innovative responses to Work Choices, it is certainly possible to identify existing light touch labour regulation by state governments, and to discuss recent and impending developments.
This article presents preliminary findings from a study of light touch labour regulation by state governments in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria. It seeks to contribute to an understanding of how the states aim to effect normative changes in employment practices and industrial relations in Australia other than through legislation. Part II of the article identifies the theoretical approaches that have informed this research. Part III outlines how the three Australian state governments under review are currently using light touch regulatory techniques to improve labour standards. We focus in turn on the states' use of public procurement; financial subsidies, tax concessions or loans; codes of practice; and best practice case studies or guidelines. This discussion demonstrates that NSW, Queensland and Victoria already use a range of regulatory techniques to promote desired labour practices. Furthermore, there are indications that the prevalence of light touch approaches by the states is likely to increase in response to Work Choices. Part IV provides a very preliminary evaluation of light touch labour regulation in Australia. It assesses the use of light touch regulation by the Australian states against a normative model of responsive regulation. It identifies a number of weaknesses with the current approaches and offers some suggestions for improvement. Suggestions for further research are also considered.
II REGULATORY THEORY A N D 'NEW GOVERNANCE'
Informing this research are perspectives drawn from regulatory theory and the 'new governance' movement in Europe and the US. 3 We adopt a broad understanding of regulation as any process or set of processes by which norms are established, the behaviour of those subject to the norms monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which there are mechanisms for holding the behaviour of regulated actors within the acceptable limits of the regime (whether by enforcement action or by some other mechanism). 4 Secondly, we recognise that, in seeking to influence behaviour, the state has available to it a number of regulatory techniques beyond the conventional 'command and control' style of regulation, in which formal rules are created, monitored and enforced by the state through orders and sanctions. 5 alternative techniques, soft or light touch approaches to regulation are distinguished from 'hard' legal or centred command and control regulation on the basis that the former are less reliant on the imposition by the state of generally applicable mandatory legal standards as a means of regulating behaviour. These light touch approaches may have advantages (or disadvantages) over command and control style regulatory approaches in that they have the potential to be more 'responsive' to complex regulatory environments and the interests of non-state actors. Thirdly, we recognise that regulation is 'multifaceted, differentiated and increasingly "shared" by a range of public and private actors.' 6 A number of scholars have suggested that the state is increasingly adopting many of these 'lighter' forms of regulation. 7 For John Braithwaite, the current era of regulation is best understood as one in which the role of the state has shifted from a provider of services and direct regulator, towards a role which is more facilitative of markets and private ordering as both mechanisms of resource provision and distribution, and of regulation. 8 Describing this era as one of 'regulatory capitalism', 9 Braithwaite observes that there is not less regulation but rather that the form of regulation has shifted. 10 12 Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair, above n 7; Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 7.
In the realm of labour law specifically, the traditional focus on 'hard' lawlegislation, awards and enterprise agreements, and case law -has indeed provided an incomplete picture of the role of the state (and of non-state actors) in regulating work. 13 The state effects normative changes in employment practices and industrial relations through a range of regulatory techniques. The wide range of techniques available to, and used by, governments to regulate labour standards is well-illustrated through the concept of a 'spectrum' of labour regulation. 14 Between the regulatory extremes of command and control legal regulation and voluntary self-regulation (where there is no direct role for the state) are a number of regulatory approaches which can be classified according to the extent of government involvement and the coerciveness of that involvement. 15 Across this spectrum, approaches vary from:
• initiatives relying on government deployment of wealth to secure behavioural change by attaching conditions to government contracts, or through the offering of financial incentives or rewards; 16 and • facilitation of 'co-regulation' or corporatist arrangements and/or 'self-regulation' by requiring or encouraging firms and stakeholders either to develop codes of practice, or standards of behaviour, which are better than state sanctioned minimums; 17 through to the use of informational strategies. 18 Informational strategies encompass the imposition of public disclosure requirements on firms, as well as governmental use of information as a regulatory instrument, including dissemination of voluntary codes of practice, 'best practice guidelines' or 'case studies'. The latter approach seeks to promote or encourage private sector take-up of decent work practices by presenting these practices in a way which suggests consistency with ideals of good corporate (self) governance. 19 We should note, however, that the different 'forms and legalities' 20 across this spectrum frequently interact with each other within a given regulatory space, and are therefore not necessarily mutually exclusive. 21 In this article, we set out some examples of Australian state governments employing light touch approaches to regulate labour practices, to assess whether these approaches are adequate alternatives or supplements to more traditional labour law. In outlining and assessing the various regulatory techniques adopted by the state governments, we distinguish between the character of the regulatory objective and the nature of the regulatory process adopted for the achievement of this objective. In relation to the former, we examine the different forms of labour regulation with an interest in the extent to which they address the quality of jobs created and maintained in the labour market. 22 While we are interested in minimum standards, we do not presume that standards of decent work are confined to current legal minimums. 23 We distinguish between approaches that endeavour to secure or improve compliance with existing standards set by legislation or by (collective) industrial instruments such as awards, and those that go beyond this to identify appropriate working conditions or forms of work organisation above the floor of minimum standards. 24 For example, we are interested in the use of light touch regulation to influence employer labour management practices in relation to 'work-life' balance or cooperative, 'high performance' work practices.
In terms of the character of regulatory processes adopted, we enquire into the nature and extent of standard-setting, monitoring and evaluation, and enforcement associated with these approaches, including the degree to which regulation is shared with non-government actors. We do not confine ourselves to legal processes. A government may, for example, require other actors to disclose information regarding compliance with particular standards as a way of enhancing monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of a regulatory regime. Similarly, information may be used for enforcement purposes, for example, where a firm is 'named and shamed' as a sanction for noncompliance. 25 
III LIGHT TOUCH LABOUR REGULATION B Y STATE GOVERNMENTS
I N AUSTRALIA Before outlining our findings, we must acknowledge some limitations on the scope of our research. Our survey of state government labour regulation is limited to three states -NSW, Queensland and Victoria -and excludes some relevant regulatory schemes which have already been subjected to scholarly analysis regarding their light touch characteristics. These schemes may be found 22 in areas such as occupational health and safety, 26 anti-discrimination legislation, 27 and the textile, clothing and footwear industry. 28 Exhibiting features of light touch responsive regulation, these models may be useful for comparative purposes in assessing the responsiveness of the regulatory initiatives that are the subject of this article. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that there are also some forms of 'corporate social responsibility' regulation which address employment systems and practices which are mostly outside the scope of our study. 29 
A Attaching Labour Conditions to Government Procurement Contracts
One of the light touch regulatory techniques used widely by governments is that of attaching 'secondary' or 'social policy' criteria to government procurement contracts. 30 There is an extensive history of governments using their market power as a major purchaser of goods and services from the private sector to promote desired labour practices, particularly those standards relating to equal opportunity employment and the payment of fair wages. 31 By attaching labour standards to contracts -through which the government purchases the goods and services it needs to carry out its functions from the private sector -governments provide businesses with an economic incentive to comply with specific labour practices. 32 extensively on public procurement as a means of promoting compliance with desired labour practices. 33 Before proceeding to outline how the three states are using public procurement as a means of promoting labour standards, it is important to note the actual and potential limitations on their power to do so. The Australian states are limited in their capacity to use public procurement and other forms of regulation to promote social policy objectives by the nature of Australian federalism. There are two legal restrictions of principal relevance. The first set of restrictions relates to the application of the federal WRA. The changes effected by Work Choices mean that the WRA 'covers the field' and thus renders as void any state 'industrial law' that seeks to regulate constitutional corporations in a manner which is inconsistent with the federal legislation. 34 The WRA, through its freedom of association provisions, also limits the capacity of state governments to encourage collective forms of workplace arrangement. 35 The second set of restrictions upon state governments arises from the promotion of competition and free trade. The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ('TPA') has been identified as a potential restriction on the capacity of a state government to use procurement to impose social obligations on businesses supplying goods or services to the government. 36 A number of commentators, however, have suggested that the TPA does not apply to public procurement. 37 Nevertheless, doubts about the extent of the TPA's application may be a reason for state government hesitation to strengthen labour conditions attached to public procurement policies.
form of 'consensual constraint' on enterprise behaviour, as it involves the control of activity through contractual or other agreements with government: Christopher Hood, The Tools of Government (1983) State governments are also restricted in their ability to use light touch labour regulation to influence labour practices in the building and construction industry. Any such regulation must take account of the Commonwealth government's National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry 38 and Implementation Guidelines for the National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry. 39 The Australian Building and Construction Commission has extensive powers under the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) to investigate alleged breaches of the industrial relations provisions of the Code, 40 not to mention substantial resources. The Commonwealth government has made it clear that any building project with Commonwealth funding must be 'Code compliant'. 41 The Code is designed to reduce union influence in the building and construction industry, so many of its requirements conflict with state governments' efforts to promote decent labour practices and facilitate trade union activity.
In NSW, Queensland and Victoria, the public procurement process is governed by a complex web of policies, frameworks, codes and guidelines. Each state has a broad procurement policy or framework that sets out general principles applying to government procurement contracts. 42 Prior to Work Choices, all three states included some labour conditions in their procurement criteria. In the case of Victoria, one of the broad policies requires all businesses that tender for government contracts to adhere to an 'ethical employment standard'. 43 Queensland and Victoria also have codes of best practice that set out specific labour standards and industrial relations practices with which all businesses in particular industries that tender for government contracts must comply. Queensland has codes of practice for the building and construction industry, call centres and the clothing industry. 44 Victoria has codes of practice for the building and construc- That is, some goods and services are procured 'centrally' through a relatively transparent tender process, while many other goods and services will be procured by departments on an 'as required' basis, so long as the purchases are within the area of their responsibility, with less information available about how this purchasing operates. 43 tion industry and for call centres. 45 In NSW, since 2005, there has been a single code of practice governing all types of government procurement, which sets out standards of behaviour expected of government agencies, tenderers, service providers, employer and industry associations and unions. 46 While all three states use public procurement as a means of promoting labour standards, their policies differ according to the type of contract or firm to which the policy applies, the precise standards promoted, the sanctions imposed for breach, and the use of monitoring mechanisms. 47 The divergent approaches of the three Australian states are contrasted below. Some recent developments which have occurred post-Work Choices are then discussed.
Applicability
The extent to which compliance with labour standards is a relevant criterion varies according to the nature, type and value of the contract. 48 For example, as noted above, provision of goods and services to the government in particular industries, such as building and construction, is governed by its own set of industrial relations principles. In Victoria, only contracts for the purchase of goods and services by the government above a certain threshold value are governed by the Ethical Purchasing Policy: contracts in excess of $100 000 generally, and contracts for the purchase of goods and services under $100 000 for 'high risk industries', such as textile, clothing and footwear, and cleaning and security services. 49 2
Standard-Setting
Governments differ as to the point in the procurement process at which they impose the labour standards and the nature of the standards. There are three stages in the procurement process at which governments can impose such standards: qualification, or eligibility to tender for a government contract; the tender assessment process; and the contractual requirements imposed on the successful tenderer.
A government may impose standards as 'qualification' criteria, thus restricting the tendering process to those companies that already comply with the social objectives. Building and construction industry contractors that wish to enter into contracts with the Queensland government, for example, must demonstrate compliance with the struction Industry as a prerequisite for submitting a tender. 50 Often, failure to comply with stipulated social criteria in previous dealings with the government may result in the supplier being deprived of the right to bid for contracts in the future. 51 According to the Victorian government's Ethical Purchasing Policy, for example, tenderers must supply the purchaser with an 'Ethical Employment Statement' detailing compliance with relevant labour legislation and industrial instruments, including any breaches of the relevant laws in the previous 24 months. 52 While there are a range of ways in which governments can integrate labour standard considerations into the tender assessment process, NSW, Queensland and Victoria all adopt a similar approach. A programme could identify a quota of contracts which are 'set aside' for contractors of a particular type, or there may be a 'price preference' for certain types of contractor whereby the bid which bidder A submits, for example, although higher than that of bidder B, is regarded as equal to that of B, if A undertakes to implement a particular social policy. The past practice or the willingness of a past bidder to implement the social objectives may be taken into account as a 'tie-breaker' where otherwise equal tenderers are in competition. Alternatively, the social criteria may be either just one consideration to take into account, or determinative where tenders are otherwise equal. Another approach may be to 'offer back' to preferred tenderers, to allow them to match the lowest bid of the non-preferred tenderer. The approach of the Australian states, however, is to include labour standards as one of a number of different criteria, including value for money, upon which tenders will be assessed. Such an approach leaves considerable space for labour-related considerations to be subsumed within, or overlooked by, government administrators under pressure to secure best value for money.
Two types of labour standard may be linked to public procurement programmes. 53 First, procurement may be used as a method of enforcing existing legal obligations: that is, as a supplement to existing mechanisms for enforcement of minimum standards set by legislation and/or industrial instruments such as awards and applicable enterprise bargaining agreements. 54 Secondly, procurement may be used to advance desired modes of labour relations above and beyond those required by law. 55 NSW, Queensland and Victoria all require those who supply goods and services to government departments and offices to comply with all applicable legislative obligations, including relevant employment-related legislation, 53 Howe, '"Money and Favours"', above n 3, 173; McCrudden, 'Using Public Procurement to Achieve Social Outcomes', above n 33, 259. 54 Howe, '"Money and Favours"', above n 3, 173. 55 Ibid. [Vol 31 awards and agreements. 56 This requirement is generally a precondition to tendering and may also be integrated into the contract. 57 In this way, their efforts supplement existing mechanisms for the enforcement of minimum standards.
Beyond this, the three states have also sought to promote desired labour practices that are above minimum standards. This is done through the use of codes of practice which are limited to particular industries or activities. These codes are intended to encourage best practice in the particular industries: while they require compliance with relevant legislation and industrial instruments, they also promote cooperative and consultative industrial relations and encourage parties to reach collective agreements and foster collective arrangements. Victoria's Code of Practice for the Building and Construction Industry -Victoria Industrial Relations Principles, for example, purports to apply a 'best practice approach' to industrial relations. 58 The Code encourages employer and industry associations, unions, contractors, subcontractors, consultants and suppliers to adopt and promote a cooperative approach to industrial relations, to communicate openly and honestly with other industry participants, and to have a commitment to a 'best practice' working environment. 59 It also promotes participation by employees and employers in industry associations. 60 The Queensland Government Code of Practice for Call Centres seeks to encourage 'continuous improvement and best practice' in the three areas of business relationships and practices, organisational systems and standards, and cooperative workforce management policies and practices. 61 A further example in which a state government has sought to use its purchasing power to promote labour standards above the minimum stipulated by law is the Victorian government's School Contract Cleaning programme. 62 range of criteria relating to employment and industrial relations practices, including 'sound practices to promote occupational health and safety', 'sound practices in human resource management', and 'compliance with relevant industrial awards/instruments'. 64 Applications for admission to the panel are assessed by the Contract Cleaners Assessment Committee, 65 comprised of representatives of the government, trade unions, contractors and schools. 66 The Committee makes recommendations to the Department. 67 Finally, the NSW Government has implemented the NSW Government Code of Practice for Procurement which covers all types of government procurement in NSW after July 2004. 68 The Code directs government agencies to consider, as evaluation criteria in addition to price, the tenderer's occupational health and safety management practices, and workplace and other industrial relations management practices and performance. 69 In relation to workplace practices, the Code recognises enterprise agreements as 'important elements in achieving continuous improvement and best practice'. 70 It identifies 'ideal' aspects of enterprise agreements, including cooperative, flexible workplace arrangements, relationships and practices. What this actually requires an agency to consider, however, is somewhat unclear. 71 The NSW government recently revised the industrial relations requirements in its procurement policy as part of its response to Work Choices. These new requirements are discussed below.
The limited extent to which state governments use public procurement programmes to promote desired workplace practices becomes apparent when we compare the Australian approach with some international examples. The Canadian government's Federal Contractors Program, designed to promote employment equity, requires contractors to implement an organisational change strategy that includes: identifying and removing artificial barriers to the selection, hiring, promotion, and training of designated groups, and taking steps to 64 Ibid. where compliance issues arise in organisations that are contracted to the government, they may be referred to the relevant departmental contract manager and then, if necessary, to the relevant departmental secretary. 78 All proven breaches of the Code will be reported to the relevant Minister for consideration. 79 Under the Victorian government's School Contract Cleaning programme, the Department of Education and Training is responsible for conducting audits of compliance. 80 
Enforcement
Standards set through public procurement programmes are generally backed up by the threat of sanctions for noncompliance, which range from warnings to preclusion from tendering opportunities for a certain period of time. In NSW, for example, sanctions for breach of public procurement contracts by a non-government party may include, in addition to any contractual or other legal remedies pursued: formal warnings that continued noncompliance will result in more severe sanctions; partial exclusion from tendering; and preclusion from tendering for any work in the supply chain for a specified period. 81 For lesser breaches, the sanctions will be applied by the single government agency. In more severe cases, 'government-wide' sanctions are available. 82 In Victoria, a tenderer who does not satisfy the requirements of the government's Ethical Purchasing Policy is disqualified from further participation in the tender process. 83 In addition, their name will be recorded on the Ethical Employment Reference Register, which is accessible to all government buyers. 84 The government takes care to emphasise, however, that this Register is not a 'black list', as the disqualified tenderer can apply for other government contracts and will be assessed anew. 85 For contractors who have been awarded a contract, failure to comply with the Ethical Purchasing Policy allows the government to terminate the contract. 86 5 Post-Work Choices State governments have indicated that reform of public procurement policies will form part of their response to Work Choices. In June 2006, the South Australian government introduced a policy requiring that a new standard clause be included in all contracts for the procurement of goods, services and construction. The clause seeks to ensure that all employees of private contractors continue to enjoy, as a minimum, terms and conditions no less favourable than those in place prior to Work Choices coming into force. 88 In NSW, the 2006 NSW Australian Labor Party State Conference passed a resolution in June demanding that the NSW government and local councils refuse to award contracts to businesses which placed workers on Australian Workplace Agreements ('AWAs'). 89 The NSW government initially expressed reservations about the legality of such a move. 90 However, in November 2006 the government released a four-page policy statement setting out new industrial relations requirements for NSW government contracts. 91 Contractors will be required to demonstrate that workers received remuneration that, on balance, results in 'no net detriment' as defined in the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) with respect to relevant state awards and contract determinations. 92 These requirements will be piloted in the contract for provision of courier and other delivery services, with the intention that, following a review of the pilot, the requirement will be implemented across government (with the exception of construction contracts). 93 In September 2006, the Victorian government announced the development of its Ethical Purchasing Policy -Mandatory Safety Net for Nominated Sectors. 94 This policy, produced in response to Work Choices, states that suppliers of goods and services to any Victorian government entity in nominated vulnerable sectors must comply with a minimum safety net of fair employment standards. To comply with this new policy, tenders and suppliers must provide their on-shore employees engaged in supplying the goods or services with terms and conditions of employment that 'are not less favourable overall' than those provided under the relevant award(s) as existed prior to Work Choices and as adjusted by the Australian Fair Pay Commission and Australian Industrial Relations Commission. Contractors must also comply with nominated state legislation. 95 nated the following sectors as 'vulnerable' and thus subject to the safety net provided by the policy: security services, catering, cleaning services, and the textile, clothing and footwear industries. 96 The Victorian government has also noted that the Victorian Workplace Rights Advocate ('VWRA') 97 and Industrial Relations Victoria would assist government procurement officials to comply with the policy requirements. 98 Queensland is expected to release a new procurement policy in early 2008. 99 
B Financial Subsidies
Financial subsidies or incentives are another instrument used by governments seeking to modify the behaviour of companies and other non-government actors. 100 Through attaching labour requirements to the disbursement of subsidies, governments have the potential to deploy their wealth resources to promote job quality, whilst stimulating local and regional industry investment. There are two types of financial incentive that may be used to regulate labour practices of firms: industry assistance grants and special purpose grants or prizes.
Industry assistance grants include the range of financial grants or subsidies provided by governments to corporations in order to facilitate economic development and job growth. Governments around the world seek to promote economic development and job creation by offering investment incentives, or financial and non-financial subsidies in order to attract or stimulate new private sector investment in a country or region. 101 Such incentives are just one of a number of forms of public assistance to industry offered by the Commonwealth and state governments in Australia. 102 These instruments often have secondary labour-related objectives in the claim that the subsidies create jobs. The extent to which governments attach labour standard conditions to industry subsidies is unclear. It is remarkably difficult to obtain information about the criteria imposed on recipients. We do know, however, that state governments have come under repeated criticism from trade unions for providing financial subsidies to companies which then either leave the jurisdiction, or adopt labour practices that are inimical to government policy. In Victoria, for example, the German supermarket chain Aldi, which received a state government subsidy and was officially 96 Ibid; Victorian Minister for Industrial Relations and Victorian Minister for Finance, above n 94. 97 opened in Victoria by then Premier Steve Bracks, has attracted criticism from trade unions for placing its Victorian employees on AWAs. 103 While publicly available information on the extent to which Australian state governments attach labour standards to industry assistance grants remains scarce, the issue has received sustained attention in the US. 104 A large number of industry subsidy programmes administered by American states now involve job quality standards. 105 Moreover, legislation in numerous US states imposes sanctions on companies that fail to comply with conditions attached to industry assistance funds. 106 The scope of such legislative provisions varies significantly -while some states apply them broadly to all subsidy programmes, others take a more limited approach. The laws also differ in the 'triggers' for sanctions, the nature of penalties and the length of time for which they hold companies accountable. If a recipient fails to comply with the conditions attached to the industry assistance, or (in some cases) where the recipient relocates outside the state within a specified period of time, the government may impose sanctions including cessation of financial assistance and the 'clawing back' of funds by requiring the recipient to reimburse the state. 107 'Clawback' provisions are justified as a means through which the government can ensure public funds return real public benefits. 108 In Australia, however, the dearth of information about the actual use of industry assistance as a technique of labour regulation has led us to focus on the second major type of financial subsidy -the use of special purpose grants or prizes.
Both Queensland and Victoria have, in recent years, used special purpose grants or prizes to recognise and reward businesses with progressive industrial relations and work organisation practices. The NSW government does not appear to have any programmes to reward businesses that adopt desired workplace practices.
The Queensland Department of Employment and Industrial Relations administers a Pay Equity Grants Program which is designed to assist registered industrial organisations involved in pay equity applications, aimed at advancing pay equity in a 'female' industry or occupation. The Program was established with a fund of $50 000 over three years and offers partial subsidies, on a dollar for dollar basis, to successful industrial organisations. 109 In addition, Queensland's Office for Women, within the Department of Local Government, Planning, Sport and Recreation, established a Partnership Grant programme in August 2004, to assist eligible organisations with projects that further the government's goals for women in Queensland, including better balancing of work and family commitments. The $500 000 grants programme offers up to $8000 for eligible projects. 110 The Victorian government has several grants programmes designed to promote progressive workplace relations. In the financial year 2004-05, Industrial Relations Victoria spent a total of $3.4 million on workplace grants. 111 The Partners at Work programme, established in 2002, is intended to encourage Victorian workplaces to develop partnerships with employees, unions and other stakeholders. The programme offers funding of up to 50 per cent of total project costs (to a maximum of $50 000). 112 By late 2005, over 60 workplaces had participated in the Partners at Work Grants programme, although it is unclear whether the Victorian government will continue to fund the programme. 113 The Victorian government has also established a Better Work and Family Balance Grants Program, which assists organisations to adopt innovative practices that improve the work and family balance of their employees. This Grants Program forms part of the Victorian Labor government's wider initiative on work and family balance -Victoria's Action Agenda for Work and Family Balance -launched in November 2003. The Better Work and Family Balance Grants Program is open to Victorian businesses and local government organisations with fewer than 200 employees. The maximum grant offered is $50 000. 114 Finally, in 2002 the Victorian government established the Premier's Awards for Workplace Excellence to promote cooperative approaches to industrial relations. 115 The identity and projects of successful recipients for all three award programmes are published as case studies for the wider business community. 116 1
Monitoring, Evaluation and Enforcement
We have not been able to ascertain how and when grants programmes are monitored and evaluated. If there is evaluation, it appears to be largely internal departmental evaluation relating to budgetary processes. Although publicising the existence of the award, and the winner's practices, may be used as an [Vol 31 informational or educational strategy to achieve behavioural change, there is little evidence of attempts to achieve such change beyond the dissemination of information about prizes through publicity material and departmental websites. While there are, in theory, several advantages and disadvantages of rewards as a regulatory technique, it is difficult to apply these considerations to the Australian states, or to evaluate the effectiveness of this regulatory technique, given the paucity of information available. 117 
C Codes of Practice
Codes of practice are difficult to classify as one type of regulatory technique, as they vary both in their degree of autonomy from government and their legal force. As this article is concerned with the role of state governments, it does not consider codes developed and adopted by companies or industries, without government involvement. We focus on codes that are developed in consultation between government, industry and other affected actors and are enforced by government and/or have a statutory basis. Such codes are often described as forms of 'co-regulation'; 'quasi-regulation' or 'hybrid regulation'. 118 The most striking aspect of the use of codes of practice by the Australian states is the uniformity of approach. The three state governments discussed have tended to produce codes of practice for the same industries and, within these, to articulate very similar labour standards, often with almost identical wording.
Codes can be a mechanism by which governments seek to enhance firms' commitment to self-regulate in a socially responsible manner, 119 by requiring them to develop a code, perhaps in conjunction with other stakeholders. In other words, the state can play a role in setting process-based standards. By going through the process of developing a code or plan, or auditing firm practices against a state-developed code of practice, it is envisaged that the firm will be able to identify, put into effect, and even to improve upon state-sanctioned behavioural norms. 120 This is described as 'procedural' or 'constitutive' regulation. 121 NSW, Queensland and Victoria use codes of practice in three main ways. The first is to specify standards of behaviour required of all government agencies. The second use of codes of practice is to specify standards of behaviour with which all companies that supply goods and services to government agencies are 117 For a discussion of the main advantages and disadvantages of this regulatory technique: see, eg, David Beam and Timothy J Conlan, 'Grants' in Lester M Salamon (ed), 119 Parker, The Open Corporation, above n 7, 2-3. 120 Smith, above n 27. 121 Johnstone, 'Regulating Occupational Health and Safety in a Changing Labour Market', above n 26.
required to comply. Finally, codes are used to articulate 'best practice' guidelines for all firms operating in specific industries. 122 We have already discussed the use of codes of practice to specify standards of behaviour required by companies which provide goods and services to state government agencies. In this context, the code of practice operates as a set of rules or principles setting particular labour standards with which the goods or service provider must comply. Thus, the code is used to set criteria through the tender award process, but may also be incorporated into the procurement contract.
The third use of codes is to specify labour standards with which private sector organisations are encouraged to comply. The Victorian Government Call Centre Code, for example, does not bind private sector organisations generally but the Victorian government 'encourages all industry participants in Victoria to adopt and adhere to the provisions and principles of the Code as operating standards'. 123 Similarly, the Victorian government's website states generally that all employers and industry associations, unions, contractors, subcontractors, consultants and suppliers are 'expected' to comply with the standards of practice set out in the Building and Construction Industry Code -Victoria Industrial Relations Principles on a voluntary basis. 124 The Queensland government encourages non-government industry participants to become signatories to the 
Codes of Practice for the Victorian Transport and Forestry Industries
These codes are dealt with separately because they are governed by special legislation and the drafting of the codes is yet to be finalised. At this early stage, the precise labour standards, and their legal effect, are unclear. [Vol 31
The Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 2005 (Vic) was promulgated by the Victorian Labor government in response to the Report of Inquiry: Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors conducted by Industrial Relations Victoria. 128 In considering the potential for a code of practice for the Victorian transport industry, the report emphasised that preference should be given to self-regulation (that is, voluntary rather than mandatory codes) where the desired change can be achieved without government intervention. 129 However, the report proceeded to note that voluntary regulation of a range of practices for owner drivers and forestry contractors had failed, including a proposed national voluntary code of commercial practices in the trucking industry. 130 Moreover, the strongly competitive nature of the industry and the fact that it lacks 'elements of strong self-regulatory institutions and frameworks and the kind of consumer and community support and acknowledgment that are essential for a voluntary code to be successful in altering behaviour', 131 suggests that there are strong reasons to formulate a mandatory code. The report concluded that an industry code of practice should contain guidelines on acceptable contracting and work practices, and that aspects of the code may be mandatory in nature and attract a penalty for breach. 132 Part 3 of the Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 2005 (Vic) provides for the Minister for Industrial Relations to prescribe industry codes of practice through regulations. 133 The Act also establishes two industry councils, the Transport Industry Council and the Forestry Industry Council, which are responsible, among other things, for providing advice to the government on the development of codes of practice. 134 These codes may provide for further mandatory regulations, or guidelines on unconscionable business conduct or on industry practice. 135 The industry councils involve various actors affected by the regulation in the development of standards, and also in monitoring and evaluation. 136 Both councils comprise government, industry, union and worker representatives. 137 
Monitoring, Evaluation and Enforcement
It is difficult to assess the extent of monitoring of, and compliance with, codes of practice. No doubt voluntary codes can assist trade unions and other worker advocates in raising public awareness regarding employers who fail to comply with the labour standards set by these codes. However, most voluntary codes do not provide for any form of consistent monitoring.
The importance of having adequate institutional arrangements in place to monitor compliance with codes is highlighted by two recent innovations in Victoria. First, the VWRA, a new institution designed to bolster monitoring and evaluation of the fairness of Victorian work arrangements after Work Choices, has been established. 139 While the functions of the VWRA include advising workers on employer compliance with labour legislation and industrial instruments, the VWRA is also empowered to take steps to encourage and promote fair workplaces and practices. 140 The VWRA is thus permitted to define fair labour practices beyond legal minimums, and monitor and evaluate business observance of those practices. Under the relevant Act, the Governor-in-Council may make regulations empowering the VWRA to develop codes of practice, whether voluntary or mandatory, on a range of workplace-related issues, including agreement-making and standard-setting. 141 The first VRWA, Tony Lawrence, has indicated that he will consider developing such codes to define fair workplace practices. 142 The second regulatory innovation in Victoria, discussed above, is the Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 2005 (Vic). 143 The Act empowers the two industry councils to advise the Minister on any other matters relevant to 'owner driver contracts' and 'the commercial practices generally engaged in by owner drivers and hirers in relation to each other', even if the Minister has not requested them to do so. 144 It is unclear, however, whether the councils have been provided with resources to carry out monitoring functions, or whether they are likely to function only in response to complaints by contractors or other bodies with an interest in the operation of the industry.
The extent to which it can be said that a code of practice is 'enforced' depends on the type of code of practice. For example, where a code of practice is used in conjunction with procurement or in the manner described under the Victorian Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 2005 (Vic), it is being used to set standards where some level of compliance is expected, and where the standards may be legally enforceable. Where codes of practice operate in a more voluntary manner, as a form of best practice guideline, then it appears less likely that there will be anything which can be characterised as enforcement of the code.
D Best Practice Case Studies or Guidelines
The final regulatory technique outlined in this article is the provision of information through best practice case studies or guidelines. NSW, Queensland and Victoria all rely heavily upon the provision of information about 'good' labour practices to promote desired labour practices. As major employers, all three states attempt to use their own employment practices as 'best practice' models for the private sector. 145 States also identify private sector employers that have adopted best practice guidelines as a way of demonstrating to other employers that such practices are not incompatible with conducting a successful and competitive business. The state governments are particularly reliant upon the provision of information and best practice guidelines for the promotion of family-friendly work practices. Despite the pervasiveness of this regulatory approach, there is little evidence to suggest that it achieves substantive outcomes.
The information provided by state governments to employers and employees can be broadly divided into two categories: information pertaining to existing legal rights and obligations, and information promoting desired labour practices. All three states provide information on the former category. 146 This article focuses on the latter.
All three states provide extensive material relating to work and family balance, which will be considered separately. Only Victoria has been particularly creative in attempting to shape employer attitudes to industrial relations and work organisation more generally. It has done so through its promotion of 'High Performance Work Practices'. 147 This goes beyond legal minimum standards, and draws on human resource management theory to emphasise work practices 145 built upon increasing communication and consultation between management and workers, cooperative workplace relations, improved training and skills, and job security. Through its website, Business Victoria makes available a 'High Performance Toolkit' (which includes a number of guidelines and case studies on enterprise bargaining agreements, workplace change, workplace consultation, workplace flexibility, and organisational diversity). 148 Under the heading of 'Innovative Organisations' are best practice case studies on high-performance organisations that have adopted innovative industrial relations practices. 149 Victoria also provides information on the recipients of the government's Partners at Work Grants, 150 Workplace Excellence Awards, 151 and Better Work and Family Balance Grants. 152 1
Promotion of Family Friendly Work Practices
Family friendly work practices is an area in which all three state governments have relied extensively on light touch regulation, particularly through information and education campaigns. The Victorian government's Action Agenda for Work and Family Balance, for example, identifies four key areas in which the Victorian government will take action to promote family friendly work practices. These include leading the way in work and family balance; 'supporting industry' to adopt practices that enhance work and family balance; working in partnership with the community on work and family issues, and demonstrating good practice in achieving work and family balance in Victorian public employment. 153 In promoting work and family policies to employers, the state governments emphasise that the adoption of such practices is in the employers' self-interest as they reduce absenteeism, improve retention of employees and contribute to better morale and higher productivity. 154 One example of the Victorian government's initiatives in the pursuit of this agenda is the Quality Part-Time Work Guidelines, which provide guidance to employers on how they might improve the quality of the part-time work they provide to workers with family responsibilities. 155 [Vol 31 The Queensland Department of Employment and Industrial Relations provides extensive information on 'Work, Family and Lifestyle' through its website. 156 The range of promotional materials available is the product of the Work and Family Unit, which was established within the Industrial Relations Department in July 2001 to provide information and education on work and family issues to both the public and private sectors, and to undertake research and policy development. 157 The Unit conducts its own research with the University of Queensland into work-life balance policies and practices in Queensland workplaces and organisational factors that might facilitate or impede the use of such policies. Additionally, it is involved in other research projects as an industry partner. The NSW Department of Industrial Relations provides information through its website on 'flexible working practices', including To a certain extent, the information strategies discussed in this Part of the article are intended to supplement labour law by providing parties to enterprise bargaining with information which may enhance the inclusion of family friendly, flexible working practices in enterprise agreements. Once again, it has been difficult to ascertain whether or not government departments endeavour to monitor and evaluate the success of these strategies in driving more family friendly employment practices. Existing studies in Australia suggest that the 'combination of relatively limited regulatory provisions with encouragement for exemplary performance' has resulted in a high level of variation in access to family friendly work practices among employees, both between those employed in different workplaces and within the same workplace. 159 3 Post-Work Choices NSW, Queensland and Victoria have increased their use of information and persuasion techniques in the wake of Work Choices. 160 161 Secondly, Queensland has introduced a Smart Workplaces initiative, which will involve the development of best practice guidelines and case studies promoting safer and more cooperative workplaces. 162 IV EVALUATION O F LIGHT TOUCH REGULATION I N AUSTRALIA While this research acknowledges the importance of broadening the study of labour law to encompass existing diversity in labour regulation, we are aware that these alternative mechanisms are not necessarily an adequate replacement for conventional labour law. How then, do we assess the extent to which alternative approaches to labour regulation can effectively operate in combination with, or as substitutes for, conventional labour law? Is the adoption of light touch approaches a recognition by government of the limits of law, especially the hierarchical model of punitive legal regulation? Is it an innovative attempt to 'capture the fine grain and reflexive fluidity needed for best local practice' 163 as a way of more effectively fostering corporate compliance with public policy norms? Can particular approaches appear light touch, but still have some bite? Or are states seizing on the rhetorical advantages of light touch regulation to satisfy core constituencies such as trade unions, thereby quelling agitation for stronger action, 164 while in effect allowing corporations to organise their labour practices without significant government influence?
In this article, we make some preliminary observations regarding the use of light touch regulation by the Australian states using a normative model of 'responsive regulation'. 165 We consider that to be effective and accountable, regulation must take account of the complexity of relationships within its 'regulatory space', acknowledging the interaction between different actors, social and economic forces, and between public and private modes of regulation. 166 Corresponding with the recognition that the state does not have a monopoly on power and resources, it has been argued that regulatory models which assume a hierarchical relationship between state regulator and those regulated will not always be effective. Instead, rule formation, monitoring, evaluation and enforcement should involve both state regulators and non-state actors affected by regulation. Our analysis must therefore be aware of the various state institutions which may be involved in labour regulation, including tribunals and government labour agencies, as well as non-state institutions such as trade unions, employers and employer-industry associations, and any other body which seeks to influence the terms and conditions under which workers are employed. 167 Further, as Sean Cooney, John Howe and Jill Murray observe, 'once it is acknowledged that parliament is not the sole source of rules, important questions about accountability and transparency are raised'. 168 We therefore need to enquire as to whether light touch labour regulation forms part of a regulatory system which maintains the right balance between regulatory actors to ensure that each is able to hold the other to account for the performance or recognition of labour standards.
Finally, notwithstanding the increased attention given to lighter forms of regulation, the literature on responsive regulation emphasises the importance for regulatory effectiveness of having a 'hybrid' or multi-layered system of regulation or governance that combines legally enforceable standards with light touch and self-regulation. 169 On this view, light touch regulation will rarely work as a stand-alone strategy. Advocates of responsive regulation have emphasised the importance of retaining institutional structures which regulate substantive ends and sanctions for enforcing those ends as the apex of an 'enforcement pyramid' necessary to ensure that other softer techniques are effective. 170 Regulation is likely to be more effective in bringing about behavioural change where state agencies adopt a combination of strategies to encourage organisations to go beyond compliance in that they become committed to regulatory goals and develop their own system of self-regulation to ensure these goals are fulfilled. 171 Our first general observation is that there is a dearth of research on the impact of light touch regulation, which makes a full evaluation of the effectiveness of these initiatives very challenging. In the context of public procurement programmes, for example, it is difficult to find any data on the extent of compliance by contractors with any social policy criteria and the success with which such programmes attain their regulatory objectives. Overseas studies of the effectiveness of procurement as a form of labour regulation have produced mixed results. 172 There is also very little discussion or analysis in the academic or non-academic literature on the impact or effectiveness of special purpose grants or prizes, despite the pervasive use of this technique. 173 In 2003, the UK Department of Trade and Industry funded a comprehensive evaluation of the Partners at Work fund. This evaluation makes a number of observations on the operation of the fund, which may be relevant to evaluating the effectiveness of similar projects in other jurisdictions. Although the evaluation found some evidence of a positive impact on employee relations on funded projects, the report concluded that the dissemination activities of the fund reached a limited audience:
our results suggest that, although enormous amounts of material have been disseminated, conferences and workshops held, and web pages created, they tend to be read, attended and visited by actors already in some ways involved in or committed to the process. Rarely, or such is the impression, do the more general dissemination activities impinge upon people -especially perhaps employers -who are ignorant of, or sceptical about, the approach. 174 We are not aware of any studies of Australian approaches along these lines.
While we have been able to establish that state governments do seek to shape labour practices through light touch regulation, it is very difficult to assess the effectiveness of the various approaches at generating widespread change outside of government. The following comments are therefore an evaluation of the design of light touch labour regulation against the normative model set out above.
Our second overall observation is that the labour criteria adopted in many of the regulatory approaches are frequently cast in very general terms, and most do not engender any specific approach to labour practices. State governments' use of public procurement to regulate labour standards in Australia, for example, has tended to focus on ensuring contractors demonstrate compliance with existing employment-related obligations, including legislation, awards and applicable agreements. While this is an important means of ensuring that governments are not rewarding companies that are avoiding their obligations and that the benefits gained through competitive tendering are not accrued on the basis of erosion of employment conditions, 175 there remains considerable scope for the state governments to go beyond this by requiring contactors to adopt labour standards or practices that are above the minimums specified by law. Moreover, the uncertain future of state labour law and of both state and federal awards under Work Choices makes these an unreliable 'anchor' for compliance purposes. A far ment practices of contractors, there was considerable scope for improvement of the programme: Orton and Ratcliffe, above n 33. better approach would be to articulate the specific standards or practices which a contractor must comply with to be eligible for a government contract. There are much more clearly articulated standards in some of the best practice guidelines and some codes of practice. 176 Moreover, special purpose grants or prize programmes and best practice guidelines are more likely to articulate 'above the floor' labour standards, including the setting out of particular approaches to work organisation such as in relation to work and family balance and high performance workplaces. However, these documents are generally used as promotional instruments and not to impose criteria on recipients of government contracts or subsidies. To the extent that they are intended to inform employers and employees about forms of decent work organisation which can be included in enterprise bargaining agreements, it could be said that they operate in conjunction with direct legal regulation as a mechanism for bolstering government impact on work practices. 177 Such documents are likely to have a weaker impact on behaviour, however, than instruments through which government deploys its wealth as an incentive for firms to agree to and comply with any standards set.
The light touch regulatory approaches examined exhibit varying degrees of responsiveness in their involvement of non-state actors. There are some programmes where standard-setting has involved industry associations and trade unions. Examples include the Victorian School Contract Cleaning programme, Quality Part-Time Work Guidelines, and the Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Code of Practice 2006. Outside of these examples, it has been difficult to ascertain exactly how the content of procurement standards, prize or reward programmes, codes of practice or best practice guidelines are set. Even in the limited number of cases in which consultation is provided for, much of the decision-making still appears to take place 'behind closed doors'. 178 This raises the related issues of accountability and transparency. These concerns are frequently raised in the governance literature in relation to several of the regulatory techniques examined here, and we have found little evidence to dispel such concerns. 179 It appears that, in general, standards are developed by state governments in consultation with, or as a result of pressure or lobbying by, industry bodies and trade unions. 180 The extent of this consultation with or involvement by relevant regulatory actors in the standard-setting process, however, remains unclear.
Insofar as there is monitoring and evaluation of compliance with labour standards under, for example, procurement policy, it appears that it is largely carried out by the relevant state government departments. The extent to which departmental resources are devoted to monitoring compliance with light touch regulation is unclear, although there is some evidence to suggest that monitoring and evaluation of light touch regulation is relatively under-resourced compared with monitoring of formal legal regulatory regimes. 181 With one or two exceptions, there seems little provision for formal involvement of other actors in monitoring and evaluation. Having said this, a lack of formal involvement would not necessarily prevent a non-state actor from monitoring a firm's compliance with stated labour criteria attached to a procurement process. Aside from concerns about the implications for accountability of under-resourced government monitoring and evaluation, regulatory scholarship suggests that bureaucratic regulation on its own is unlikely to maximise effectiveness of the particular regulatory regime. 182 A more responsive and accountable regulatory model would formally involve non-state actors in the process of monitoring firm performance against standards. In establishing the VWRA, for example, the Victorian government has at least set up a relatively independent agency to carry out monitoring and evaluation, and perhaps develop new standards. The Queensland government has followed Victoria's lead by setting up a similar office. 183 Effective monitoring and evaluation by non-state actors is dependent upon these actors having adequate access to information. During our research, we found a lack of disclosure regarding assessment of procurement tenders, the content of procurement contracts, and industry subsidies. One possibility for state government action is legislation requiring disclosure by firms of their compliance with codes of practice and so on. Increasing disclosure requirements would at least facilitate more effective monitoring and evaluation by non-state actors, without necessarily empowering them as monitors or enforcers of the standards.
for improvement in current light touch labour regulation, as many of the approaches discussed are relatively weak, informational strategies. We have identified a number of possible regulatory improvements. First, the state governments could be more ambitious in the labour standards they seek to promote, particularly in relation to public procurement and financial subsidies. Even in light of the serious legal limitations on their capacity to require companies to engage in collective bargaining, for example, state governments should consider divorcing labour standards from industrial instruments. Secondly, the design of the initiatives could be improved. By improvement, we mean enhancing the effectiveness and democratic accountability of these approaches as mechanisms for enhancing labour standards and rights in Australia. In many cases, standard-setting itself needs to be a more transparent process involving both trade unions and other worker representatives as well as industry. Effectiveness could be improved through providing more access to information so that industry, trade unions and other members of the public can assist in monitoring and evaluation. There also remains scope for more innovative use of sanctions for noncompliance with the goals of light touch labour regulation. Sanctions could include, for example, withdrawal of financial benefits and denial of government contracts and subsidies; publicity sanctions that can be used to threaten the reputation of businesses and other organisations; as well as more traditional 'command and control' sanctions such as the imposition of financial and other penalties. 186 While this article has mapped current light touch approaches to labour standards in three of the Australian states, there remains much research to be conducted in this area. This research could include closer examination of some of the regulatory initiatives discussed in this article to identify strengths and weaknesses. Critical questions remain concerning the impact of the various techniques, including the role of state departments in monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of many of the strategies discussed. It also appears that there is scope for drawing upon regulatory literature and developments overseas to explore ways in which at least some of these approaches could be more effectively utilised as techniques of labour regulation. Finally, of course, it will be important to follow any further developments in the use of light touch labour regulation as state governments look for ways to respond to Work Choices.
